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Following the collapse of Ansett in September 2001 and the emergence of low cost 
carriers Virgin Blue and Jetstar, domestic air travel has experienced considerable 
growth. Aggressive marketing strategies, low fares and increased capacity by both 
Virgin Blue and Jetstar with B737 and A320 services have benefited many Queensland 
destinations such as Cairns. However as the research presented in this paper shows 
much of the growth in air travel attributed to Low Cost Carriers has occUlTed at the 
expense of modes such as drive, long distance coaches and rail. This paper examines the 
impact of LCCs on the modal composition of travel to Cairns with particular emphasis 
on aviation. 
Keywords: low cost carriers, regional tourism growth, Cairns, Virgin Blue, Jetstar, 
transport modes. 
INTRODUCTION 
Deregulation of domestic aviation markets commenced in 1990 although it was not until a 
decade later that Low Cost Carriers (LCCs) became an established part of the Australian 
aviation market. Aggressive marketing and deep discounting by LCCs has stimulated significant 
growth in air travel as the public have been able to travel further and more often because of 
lower prices. The tourism industry appears to have has been a major beneficiary of LCCs 
particularly in regional Australia. However, instead of creating overall growth in domestic 
tourism the introduction of LCCs has encouraged mode substitution from cars and coaches to 
planes. The research undertaken in this paper indicates that in the period from 2001 to 2005 the 
growth in air travel to Queensland has been at the expense of other modes, particularly the drive 
sector. While largely unreported, the fall in drive tourism has had an impact on tourism 
dependent firms in the transit corridors that connect generating regions and regional 
destinations. In the future there is also a danger that the introduction of the LCC model to 
international aviation will further erode the domestic tourism market as domestic travel is 
substituted for international travel. 
The current growth of air travel encouraged by LCC and the parallel decline in drive tourism 
can be described as the second wave of transport substitution caused by LCCs. The first wave 
occurred after deregulation in 1990 when Compass introduced low fares and had a significant 
impact on the national long distance coach network. Cheap air fares encouraged passengers to 
switch to air and within 12 months a number of national coach operators including Deluxe had 
collapsed. The shakeout continued over the next decade until by the time the second wave of 
deregulation occurred the number of national operators had fallen to one. After reviewing the 
characteristics and development of LCCs this paper examines how they have effected the model 
composition of tourism travel to Cairns in Queensland. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF LCCS 
Australia's two low cost carriers, Virgin Blue and Jetstar, operate a total of 74 aircraft (as at 
July 2006) and have developed extensive route networks. In the Queensland domestic market, 
for example, LCCs account for 60% of total seat capacity. The operational structure of a 'no 
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frills' airline is not governed by any specific set of fonnulaic approaches (Childs 2000). Each 
airline has to assess the relative conditions of the market they intend to operate in taking into 
account a range of market factors such as which routes to enter, aircraft type, seat capacity, and 
competitive conditions. Overall however, there is a need to be adaptive in the short tenn and 
highly competitive in the long tenn (Donne 2000). All aspects of the operations of LCCs are 
directed to achieving a cost advantage, expressed in operating cents per passenger kilometer, 
and to maximize revenues. To reduce seat cost per kilometre a variety of operating strategies 
are employed including offering lower wages and less generous conditions than full service 
airlines, achieving fast turnarounds, cleaning of the interior of the aircraft by cabin crew, 
minimal crew expenses for overnight stays, lower marketing costs through Internet distribution 
and low administrative overhead costs. The importance of cost advantage was demonstrated by 
Jetstar when it was able to achieve a market entry cost base of 8.25 cents per available seat 
kilometer (ASK) compared to 8.72 for Virgin Blue (Creedy 2004). With an all A320 fleet, 
Jetstar expects its cost base to fall to 7.8 cents per ASK (Creedy 2004). LCC strategies are 
ultimately aimed at minimizing operating costs whilst maximising revenue and yield. 
Globally, a key factor of LCCs success has been the operation of fleets based on one aircraft 
type or variations of the same marque such as the 700 and 800 series Boeing 737s and all 
economy class seating. This operational model is designed to minimise maintenance costs, 
reduce inventory and spares, simplifier crew rosters and achieve efficiencies in crew training. 
LCCs do not provide complimentary in-flight meals/snacks or free drinks or include in-flight 
entertainment in ticket prices. In most cases LCCs prefer to lease aircraft which gives them 
flexibility to respond to fluctuating demand between peak summer and winter traffic, acquire 
newer aircraft and achieve lower capital outlays with monthly fixed lease charges. 
LCCs generally operate short haul flights between one and two hours in length although in 
Australia there are some exceptions such as coast to coast services and direct flights from 
Adelaide and Melbourne to Cairns. This enables LCCs to gain more operating cycles and 
achieve a higher number of flying hours per day than most full service airlines (Frawley 2004). 
However, because air fares are usually pitched below those of Full Service Airlines (FSA) a 
higher load factor is often necessary to achieve profitability but this is managed through 
sophisticated revenue management systems. LCCs also contract out a range of services 
including maintenance so that they keep costs variable rather than in high fixed cost assets and 
plant. Table 1 below shows the competitive strategies of low cost carriers. 
Table 1 
C ompetltIve s trategles opte )y Ad db L ow C ost A' r lr Illes 
Markets/Routes Enter highly trafficked routes where market penetration 
strategy can be applied 
Alternatively, carve out niches by serving and growing 
leisure markets using non-major a~orts 
Equipment Generally operate one type of aircraft. Save on inventory, 
spares, training and know le4.Ke reguired 
Airport Keep it simple and basic. No lounges, unnecessary space. 
Terminals Fast turnarounds, e.g. Southwest Airlines are 20 minutes. 
Utilisation Aim is to achieve 11 hours flying time per aircraft per day 
whereas full service airlines achieve over etght hours. 
In-flight service Minimal customers can buy snack food and limited range 
of beverages. No need to have flight kitchens and 
associated overheads - contract out this service. 
Labour costs Employ pilots and cabin staff under schemes different to 
full service airlines 
Distribution 
Pricing Strategy 
Developed by authors 
LCC IN AUSTRALIA 
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Try to avoid overnight stays with scheduling and crews 
Use younger staff and more contract, casual employees 
Maintain a small head office and locate themselves near 
airport or in a lower priced rental area. 
Encourage direct business and web bookings versus 
widespread travel agency distribution. Save on selling 
expenses - servicing agents and commission. 
Keep fares below the full service airlines 
Tend to keep fare structures uncomplicated 
Offer prize draws and inducements to stimulate demand 
and maintain customer interest as well as publicity 
generated 
All one-class travel. 
Australia's early experience with a 'value-based' airline came soon after deregulation when 
Compass Airlines begun services in December 1990. Compass claimed to have a lower seat per 
kilometer cost than the two incumbent airlines (Qantas and Ansett) and quickly achieved a 10 
per cent share of the market but a year later Compass ceased operations. A second Compass 
Airlines under different ownership lasted an even shorter time. 
Although both Ansett and Qantas offered a range of advance purchasing fares aimed at the 
leisure market, both carriers were regarded as legacy airlines and their extensive route network 
costs was ill-suited to a low cost operation. A major change occurred in 1999 when the Federal 
government, perhaps recognizing that deregulation had failed to achieve one of its aims of 
having at least one new entrant, allowed Virgin to establish a 100 per cent foreign-owned 
airline to operate in the domestic market. Virgin's business model was a adaptation of the 
model used by other successful LCCs including Virgin Atlantic. 
Virgin Blue became the first new entrant into the domestic market for almost a decade. Its start 
was initially small and it had only four aircraft. However, the carrier quickly gained momentum 
and its fresh brand and different style of doing things became widely accepted by the traveling 
public. Its fare structure was simple yet innovative and it advertised one way fares. In its first 
year of operation, Virgin only captured 5-6 per cent market share but it had a significant impact 
on Ansett. Following the collapse of Ansett in September 2001, Virgin was able to increase its 
fleet and quickly captured a 30 per cent market share. Its profits grew and its continued 
penetration into the leisure market forced a rethink of strategy within Qantas. 
The Qantas response was to launch its own low cost carrier. Many aviation commentators and 
writers were skeptical about its success drawing their conclusions from the examples overseas 
where full service airlines had tried, usually unsuccessfully, to operate a low cost subsidiary 
airline. From the date that the Qantas Board agreed to establish a LCC, the time it took Jetstar 
to began operations was less than one year. A considerable amount of Qantas' resources were 
allocated to the creation of Jetstar although Qantas denied its start-up costs were as high as the 
$90 million reported (Frawley 2004; Sandilands 2004). The new carrier was headed by Alan 
Joyce who had learned the LCC industry with Ryanair, the airline on which Jetstar was 
modeled. It began services in May 2004 with a different livery and image and staff employed 
under different terms and conditions that were less costly than the Qantas model. To avoid 
direct competition between the two carriers, Qantas segmented the Australian market into: 
leisure routes where the majority of travelers were holiday makers or visiting friends and 
relatives (VFR) passengers; and high yield business routes. On the leisure routes Jetstar 
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services have largely replaced Qantas services. As a strategy, Qantas created a pincer 
movement around Virgin. Qantas ceded its leisure market to Jetstar which then sort to increase 
it share of this market by capturing customers from Virgin. 
Since 2002 and post the Ansett collapse, growth in passenger numbers has increased from 30 
million in 2002 to 42 million in early 2006. Much of this growth can be attributable to the 
emergence of LCCs. Capacity has grown strongly especially to leisure ports that are now 
served by B737 or A320 aircraft. 
MARKETING STRATEGIES 
A key marketing strategy for both LCCs has been seat sales. Seat sales are heavily promoted to 
a range of destinations with the total number of seats advertised (but not to each destination or 
on each flight). Seat sales apply for a limited period or until sold out. The lead times can be 
both short and long, for instance a seat sale advertised by Virgin Blue in September was for 
travel in February after the end of the school holidays. When Jetstar was launched it made an 
introductory seat sale offer of 200,000 seats at $29 that was immediately countered by Virgin 
Blue offering 300,000 seats on selected routes (Creedy 2004). In January 2005 Jetstar again 
initiated a fare war by offering 300,000 seats at a base fare of $9 plus taxes on 15 routes 
including Sydney- Sunshine Coast and Sydney-Gold Coast (Creedy 2004). Other routes on the 
airline's network were offered between $29 and $69 one way. Jetstar claimed they were trying 
to "incentivise" more travel during the traditionally lower patronised periods such as February. 
Jetstar also stated that they were determined to be the lowest fare operator in the domestic 
market (Owen-Browne 2003). Only a few days later after the Jetstar offering, Virgin Blue 
announced $1 flights when it launched what some viewed as a promotional gimmick with its 
"happy hour" perpetual sale on the Internet between 1300-1400 hours daily. The discount 
flights had to be taken within 30 days and routes varied on a day-to-day basis. On the first day 
the happy hour fares were released, about 1,000 people took advantage of the sale, twice the 
number expected given the lack of advertising. 
IMPACT ON OTHER TRANSPORT MODES 
The low fare environment has caused a shift in the modal composition of tourism transport in a 
number of destinations. The impact on Cairns in paliicular will be discussed later. Impacts 
include a fall in drive tourism and the near demise of inter-city coach travel which by 2006 had 
consolidated into one national operator operating under several brand names. Coach operators 
now focus on regional networks and special interest groups such as backpackers, although city 
to city services on a national basis are still operated. Passenger rail has also suffered as a result 
of LCCs. Train journeys between southern state capitals take about 12-13 hours but can be 
flown in a little over an hour for the same price or lower. 
INCREASED DEMAND FOR AIR TRAVEL TO QUEENSLAND 
The introduction of LCCs opened new markets for many regional destinations in Queensland 
however the overall increase in visitor numbers in some areas has not been as large. 
Destinations now benefiting from increased flights include Proserpine (Whitsunday Coast 
Airport), Hamilton Island, Hervey Bay airport (from July 2005), the Sunshine Coast 
(Maroochydore) and Cairns. LCCs operate into ten Queensland destinations from Cairns in the 
north to Coolangatta in the south. Table 2 illustrates the pattern of domestic travel into 
Queensland and for the Gold Cast and Cairns for the period 2001 to 2005 based on passenger 
modes. 
Table 2 indicates that there has been substantial growth in domestic air travel into Queensland 
during the period (22% or 755,000 persons) however during the same time self drive has 
declined by 4.5%. In actual visitor numbers self drive arrivals have declined by 527,000 
persons. In the same period declines have been experienced in coach travel by 129,000 persons 
(down 44%) and rail by 27,000 persons. Based on these figures it is apparent that the increase 
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in travel by air has been at the expense of travel by self drive and coach. Thus, rather than 
increasing overall travel to Queensland, LCCs have created a substitution effect between modes. 
Given that the overall national domestic tourism market has been almost static for some time 
any increase achieved by one mode will almost always be at the expense of competing modes. 
When the figures presented in Table 2 are analysed on a destination by destination basis a 
different pattern emerges. In the 5 year period 2001-2005 Brisbane has only experienced 
marginal growth (3%) in visitor arrival by air whereas Tropical NOlih Queensland has 
experienced a 35% growth in arrivals by air while the Gold Coast has achieved an 18% rate of 
growth. In the case of Cairns, the growth in domestic arrivals by air (up from 421,000 in 2001 
to 570,000 in 2005) has been largely achieved at the expense of self drive which has declined 
(26%) during the period from 832,000 to 610,000. Bus and coach also declined by 65% from an 
already low base of27,000. 
The shift from self drive to air can be expected to have a number of implications for tourism 
related businesses in the transit zones linking major destinations with their source markets. 
These may include a fall in visitation to small rural towns, loss of revenue for tourism 
dependent businesses and ultimately less demand for labour. In the destinations enjoying a 
higher arrival rate by air car rental businesses and tour operators stand to gain the most. These 
impacts have yet to be assessed. 
Table 2 
Transport Used by Domestic Overnight Visitors (Visitors) 
Transport Year lYear [Year Year lYear 
lRegion used on ending ending ~nding ending ending December !December !December !December !December trip 2001 2002 ~003 2004 2005 
IBrisbane ~ir 1,443,000 1,289,000 1,344,000 1,434,000 1,487,000 
lWater 47,000 52,000 61,000 58,000 69,000 
Self Drive 2,711,000 2,672,000 2,909,000 2,894,000 2,646,000 
Bus or 85,000 86,000 101,000 92,000 82,000 Coach 
Rail 142,000 194,000 140,000 237,000 213,000 
Other 83,000 90,000 100,000 116,000 71,000 
Not asked 6,000 7,000 6,000 7,000 15,000 
Gold Coast Air 985,000 991,000 845,000 1,111,000 1,161,000 
Water 16,000 12,000 33,000 20,000 10,000 
Self Drive 2,265,000 2,370,000 2,567,000 2,289,000 2,224,000 
Bus or 88,000 56,000 68,000 51,000 51,000 Coach 
Rail 145,000 99,000 82,000 63,000 ~8,000 
Other 38,000 16,000 31,000 ~O,OOO 27,000 
Not asked 3,000 3,000 10,000 14,000 6,000 
Queensland Air 3,445,000 3,326,000 3,575,000 ~,066,000 4,200,000 
Water 112,000 161,000 128,000 126,000 146,000 
Self Drive 11,614,000 11,693,000 11,364,000 11,833,000 11,087,000 
Bus or 380,000 321,000 347,000 299,000 251,000 Coach 
Rail ~39,000 480,000 362,000 ~58,000 422,000 
Other 179,000 222,000 294,000 262,000 224,000 
1N0t asked ~7,000 31,000 55,000 31,000 40,000 
Irropical ~ir 421,000 389,000 606,000 642,000 570,000 
North 
Queensland Water 9,000 
Self Drive 823,000 
Bus or 27,000 Coach 
Rail 24,000 
Other 14,000 
Not asked 12,000 
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20,000 13,000 26,000 2,000 
778,000 712,000 744,000 610,000 
45,000 38,000 35,000 12,000 
15,000 25,000 14,000 36,000 
21,000 45,000 19,000 14,000 
8,000 19,000 15,000 7,000 
Source: DecIpher accessed 28 September 2006 
CAIRNS 
Caims is both a major intemational airport as well as a domestic port and since the opening of 
an intemational terminal in 1984 intemational arrivals have grow rapidly and by 2005 had 
reached 538,614 (Caims Port Authority 2006). Domestic arrivals have also grown particularly 
in recent years with the introduction of cheap seats by LCCs. As Prideaux (2000) pointed out 
the reduction in airfares to desirable destinations is likely to encourage destination and/or mode 
substitution. In the case of Caims it appears that given the static nature of national tourism 
demand (almost no growth between 2000 and 2003), domestic arrival in Caims by air has been 
at the expense of other destinations and at the expense of drive tourism. Figure 1 illustrates the 
impact that air fare reductions made possible by LCCs can have on destinations. 
Cost 
Figure 1 
Maximum personal holiday budget C .... ········ ...... ····· .. ··· .. ····················· .... · .. · .. ··· ................................................................................................................................................... . 
E 
D 
A 
Transport 
Access Cost 
Discretionary 
............................................................... , Spending 
. ....... ................ .............................................. ..........................................t ~~~tOmmOdation 
DICDestinatiOn) 
Distance 
In Figure 1, the vertical axis represents the various costs encountered while holidaying, and the 
horizontal axis represents the distance of travel. Point A is the visitor origin point and D 
represents the destination that receives visitors from A. Accommodation cost is represented by 
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AD while discretionary expenditure is represented by DE (including shopping, tours and 
enteliainment). Tourist may substitute between these expenditure categories thus a tourist may 
reduce expenditure on accommodation to increase expenditure on discretionary goods and 
services. The cost of transport to the destination is represented by EC. EC potentially has three 
components: 
• The actual fare cost expressed in dollars, 
• Time taken to travel from the origin to the destination. This is often not costed in 
specific dollar terms but is a real cost particularly where the tourist has limited time 
patiiculary if the individual tourist places a cost on the time taken to travel between the 
origin and destination, and 
• The cost of comfort (an example in rail travel is first class air versus economy seats). 
Transport costs may be treaded as variable because they increase with distance from an origin 
point and are tied to the various transport modes available. Tourists are also assumed to have a 
predetermined maximum personal holiday budget represented in Figure I as CCI. In this paper, 
CCI is assumed to represent the travel budget of all travellers from origin A but in reality each 
individual will have their own unique budget which will determine their individual travel 
decisions. For purposes of illustration, travellers from origin A to destination D have a number 
of travel options with TCI being the most expensive, TC3 the least expensive, where TC 
represents Travel Cost. To illustrate the options that become available to tourists when discount 
airfares are introduced to a destination a travel scenario is presented to show the interaction 
between the level of airfares charged and how tourists can adjust the budgeting mix for the three 
components of travel (transport, accommodation and discretionary expenditure). The scenario 
considers the impact of airfares and for the purposes of this discussion TCI represents the cost 
of airfares charged by a non discount carrier such as Qantas and TC 3 represents the cost of 
travel by a discount carrier. For the purposes of this scenario TC 2 represents another transport 
mode, in this case by road. On 30 tl1 October 2006 a standard fully refundable economy one way 
airfare from Sydney to Cairns by Qantas (TCI) for travel on 18tl1 December was quoted as $782 
while the lowest cost promotional fare was $212. On the same date the cost of a fully 
refundable Virgin Blue fare (TC3) was $499 and the lowest promotional fare was $179. If the 
cost of the full price air ticket exceeds the tourists total travel budget they are likely to see an 
alternative destination. The Virgin Blue fare is a more attractive fare for travel to Cairns and 
would make Cairns a suitable destination choice if the fare price fell within the person's travel 
budget. It is also clear that the reduction in air fares made possible by LCCs has an impact on 
other modes as illustrated in Table 2. By substituting air travel for road travel consumers also 
believe that they will incur a travel cost below TC2 thus saving them money. 
Building on the cost factors outlined above, it is clear that the purchaser of a low cost airfare has 
a surplus, based on the difference between the sum of the cost of the airfare plus AD + DE. 
This surplus may be used for a number of purposes including and extension of the length of 
time spent in the destination, an accommodation upgrade, additional discretionary purchases or 
they may select from a mix of these. As an alternative they may elect to use the saving for 
further travel at a later date. In the case of Cairns, the evidence outlined in Table 2 indicates that 
overall savings through cheaper airfares have resulted in additional air travel to Cairns. 
When assessing the impact of LCCs it is possible to take several perspectives including an 
origin perspective and a destination perspective. From an origin perspective the normal rule is 
that as distance between the origin and destination increases the greater will be the cost of 
travel. As the distance increases destinations increasingly can be viewed as being on the 
periphery. Peripheries need not be only physical and can be based on perceptions of distance or 
on other factors, the principal of which is cost. In physical telms a periphery is a spatial concept 
that measures the location of a point of interest in a remote location by actual distance. A 
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periphery can also be based on a perception of distance that separates it from the core. In this 
case the term 'core' refers to a tourism generating region (Oppermann 1993; Pearce 1995; 
Weaver 1998). The further the periphery is from the core the more difficult it is to generate 
visitor flows from the core. Peripheries are also based on cost of travel. The economies of 
aircraft such as the B 747 and Airbus 330 have reduced both the time and cost of travel thus 
reducing its degree of relative peripherality. On a small scale the introduction of LCCs has 
reduced the cost of travel from major domestic generating regions to peripheral locations such 
as Cairns. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper highlights a largely unrepOlied impact of LCCs on regional destinations. While air 
travel has achieved strong growth in the years following the start of the second wave of LCCs 
operations with Virgin Blue there has not been a cOlTesponding increase in domestic tourism. 
Between 2000 and 2003 national overnight visitors to states and telTitories has fallen slightly 
from 73,771,000 to 73,612,000 (Decipher accessed 28 September 2006). Further analysis of 
national visitor data reveals that the shift in travel mode has been at the expense of drive 
tourism, long distance coach travel and rail. 
It is therefore apparent that regional areas through which the drive tourists lost to LCCs 
previously traveled are experiencing a decline in visitor numbers. IlTespective of the recent 
issue of increase fuel prices regional areas in the transit areas between major tourism generating 
and destination centers are unlikely to regain this traffic if the pattern of model substitution 
experienced in the first wave of deregulation (1990) is repeated in the second wave of 
deregulation. Given the static nature of domestic tourism in Australia it is also likely that further 
growth in LCCs can only occur if international alTiva1s increase, Qantas loses market share or 
more travelers switch from road to air. 
A further possible impact of LCCs on domestic tourism is likely to occur as a consequence of 
the growing demand for outbound travel. This will have a major impact on holiday/leisure 
destinations in Queensland and elsewhere. For example, for the year ended June 2005, 
Queensland resident departures for overseas destinations increased by 18.3 per cent (Tourism 
Queensland 2006). This is a wonying statistic for domestic tourism marketers. If the same 
growth is achieved in international LCCs services as has been achieved in domestic LCC 
services a number of popular regional destinations such as Cairns and the Gold Coast will face 
increased competition. Drive destinations in particular have come under increased competitive 
pressure. 
LCCs have made a substantial impact on the way Australians think about travel and how they 
book it. With simplified fares, internet bookings, ticketless travel and relatively easy check-in, 
coupled and a good on-time performance, smart management and operating systems, LCCs now 
enjoy almost 45 per cent market share of all trunk route traffic and account for 60 per cent of 
seat capacity into Queensland. How much fUliher can they can grow within Australia is an 
interesting question. Capacity may now have reached its peak as LCCs try to consolidate and 
concentrate on bottom line earnings. Clever marketing, including more co-operative marketing 
between destinations and LCCs, as well as investment in upgrading CUlTent infrastructure and 
building new infrastructure will need to be used to retain market share in the face of increasing 
demand for overseas travel. 
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